INTRODUCTION
After only twelve days in office, President George W. Bush announced the "New Freedom Initiative" (NFI), I a domestic policy program aimed at "tearing intention of stringently safeguarding his father's legacy was clearly pronounced: "Wherever a door is closed to anyone because of a disability, we must work to open it. Wherever any job or home, or means of transportation is unfairly denied because of a disability, we must work to change it."! I In consequence, the NFI's scope is ambitious, encompassing goals that range from alternative means of public transportation to greater home ownership for people with disabilities. 12 Yet, despite setting forth a promising agenda aimed at improving the relative economic and social position of Americans with disabilities (implementing some policy features that have been promoted by myself13 and others14 over the past decade), the dynamic underlying the NFI is troubling. For in seeking to incorporate people with disabilities into mainstream society, the initiative at times places the onus of integration squarely upon the disabled.
To illustrate, central to the section entitled "Integrating Americans with Disabilities into the Workplace"l5 (and played up considerably at the press conference)I6 is a proposal to increase "telework" (meaning long-distance computer-assisted commuting) for disabled workers by "guarantee[ing] lowincome loans for people with disabilities to purchase equipment to telecommute from home."17 As a general proposition, it is difficult to overestimate the importance and centrality of employment!& both for workers with disabilities,I9 II. For the full text, see Bush, supra note 7. Unstated were some odd parallels. For instance, after signing the ADA into law, the elder Bush leaned over and kissed quadriplegic Evan Kemp on the head. See Stein, supra note 10, at 248. After proposing the NFI, Bush the younger kissed quadriplegic Jim Mullen on the cheek. See Sanger, supra note 4.
12. See and those without. 20 Certainly, increasing telecommuting and other employment options for disabled workers is a laudable21 and much needed22 policy goal. But the NFI's proposal, framed in terms of "integrating" disabled workers, may reify a key misperception that segregates these individuals from the general workforce population.23 For in seeking to remedy disabled-labor market exclusion by diminishing technological equipment expenses (a dubious proposition in light of the disabled poverty level24 and the complete absence of targeted job programs to assist them25) the NFI implies that what keeps people with disabilities unemployed is their inherent impairments, rather than artificially exclusionary practices. 26 Thus, one logical implication of the NFI' s statement of policy is that in order to participate in the mainstream societal function of work, people with disabilities must further adapt themselves to its established routines.
J. Soc. POL'Y. & L. 477 (2001) (arguing that not only should individuals capable of any gainful employment be required to work, but that society has a duty to so assist them). This notion, that individuals who have historically been categorized as "disabled" ought to fit seamlessly into the modern workplace (if they are to fit at all), is central to Ruth O'Brien's recent and provocative book, Crippled Justice: The History of Modern Disability Policy in the Workplace. O'Brien contends that the "whole man"27 concept of vocational rehabilitation developed during the 1950s and 1960s to "treat" the disabled instantiated the notion that it is people with disabilities, rather than society, that must change. It is to the intellectual, political, and juridical development of this schema that I now turn.
Vicki Schultz makes these arguments with intelligence and insight in
Part I examines the historical underpinnings of the whole man schema and the ways in which O'Brien asserts that it influences Supreme Court opposition to disability-related employment rights. Part II provides an overview of recent scholarship on the Court's ADA jurisprudence and places Crippled Justice within the context of these studies. Finally, Part III critiques O'Brien's averments about the Court's jurisprudence and offers an alternative metric with which to understand these rulings.
I. THE "WHOLE MAN" SCHEMA
According to O'Brien, modern disability· employment practices are influenced by vocational rehabilitation policies that only integrate disabled workers who have fully adapted themselves to the workplace. One consequence of this normative schema, which O'Brien avers influences judicial attitudes towards people with disabilities, is Supreme Court resistance to disability rights, especially the ADA's employment provisions.
A 32. Pp. 47-48, 50-52. In treating the whole man, the Menninger brothers, along with other post-World War II psychiatrists, sought to change psychiatry's perspective by identifying "appropriate social and environmental changes that presumably could optimize mental as well as physical health." GERALD GROB, THE MAD AMONG Us 195 (1994) . In conjunction with this broad environmental approach, Karl Menninger focused on "the total economics of the personality rather than [viewing the disability] as something alien to the patient." ELIZABETH LUNBECK, THE PSYCHIATRIC PERSUASION 118 (1994). Recognizing that it was the doctor who must treat the dynamic interplay of the entire person, Franz Alexander hypothesized that "[t]he physiological changes accompanying the chronic emotions associated with unresolved conflict were the physiological changes that would give rise to alterations in structure and to disease." REUBEN F!NE, THE HISTORY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS 224 (1979). Additionally, Flanders Dunbar supported the perspective in rehabilitation medicine that emotional illness, which causes a particular physical ailment, must be addressed and resolved prior to any resolution of the physical symptoms. 44. By contrast, Harlan Hahn, a political scientist from University of Southern California and one of the founders of the Disability Studies movement, advocated adapting the surrounding environment to meet the needs of the people with disabilities. Hahn recognized that "the primary problems confronting citizens with disabilities are bias, goal, teams of professionals and doctors treated the "whole" patient, psychologically and physically, in hospital-like rehabilitation centers.45 A second consequence of the rehabilitation community's categorical support of the whole man theory was its resistance to rights-based legislation, notably attempts by activist Paul Strachan to procure an act prohibiting discrimination in employment. This disinclination was motivated by dual concerns. First, that such entitlements would challenge the epistemic community's goal of channeling people with disabilities into the workforce by rehabilitating their defects (rather than by forcing employers to hire misfits). Second, that rightsbased legislation would imperil federal funding for vocational rehabilitation programs by drawing attention to the practice of focusing their efforts on those most likely to succeed. 46 The crowning glory of Rusk and Switzer's combined efforts was adoption of the Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1954 (VRA),47 a key feature of President Eisenhower's larger Cold War agenda of developing "nonsocialistic" domestic social programs.48 Passage of the VRA resulted in more funds and grants for research, construction of rehabilitation centers, training of vocational rehabilitation professionals, and the establishment of the National Advisory Council on Vocational Rehabilitation.49
The preference for a rehabilitative (rather than a rights) theory for improving the lives of disabled Americans reached a golden age during President Johnson's administration, when the VRA was renewed,50 even more rehabilitation centers were built, the total federal rehabilitation program budget was doubled, and new advisory boards were implemented.51 The building of this "rehabilitation empire" peaked in 1967 with the creation of the Social prejudice, segregation, and discrimination that can be eradicated through policies designed to Rehabilitation Service, which consolidated all rehabilitation services under one roof, with Switzer appointed as its head until she retired in 1970.52
B. The Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act
Despite the prevailing penchant for rehabilitation in lieu of rights, O'Brien relates how rights were legislated in the end as "an accident ofhistory."53 The philosophy of self-determination, developed within the disability context by Ed Roberts of the Center for Independent Living in Berkeley, California,54 inspired disability rights advocates to protest the exclusion of people with disabilities from society at large and their concurrent warehousing under "inhumane conditions."55 Part of this civil rights scheme was resistance to what advocates deemed the paternalistic posture of rehabilitation medicine, one they claimed viewed people with disabilities as child-like and unable to care or make decisions for themselves. 56
In contrast to the paternalism of the Rehabilitation Movement, the Independent Living Movement, as well as other disability rights groups, advocated the independence of disabled people as full and active members of society.57 Over time, the progress of this disability rights-based agenda faced resistance from an oddly matched political coalition that included the Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations, as well as several civil rights leaders.58 This opposition was united by the concern that extending established antidiscrimination provisions to the disabled would weaken protections for other constituencies. 59 President Carter's decision to preclude passage of the Equal Employment Opportunity for the Handicapped Act was motivated by similar concerns.60
The Rehabilitation Act was nonetheless enacted, ironically as a direct result of the civil rights movement,6I with antidiscrimination principles 52. Pp 60 . Carter also perceived a distinction between race-and sex-based prohibitions and those extended to the disabled, whom he evaluated as "impaired in some abilities and function." P. 114.
61. Pp. 109-17.
intact. 62 Introduced by Senator Cranston in large part as an effort to eliminate "creaming"-a practice in which employers hire either workers with minimal disabilities or only those individuals with disabilities who require the least expensive accommodations63_the Rehabilitation Act had a two-prong focus on both affirmative action and antidiscrimination.64 Section 501 was directed at affirmative action hiring practice for federal agencies,65 section 503 at businesses that received governmental contracts.66 Section 504, inserted as a gesture of goodwill without full consideration of its import, prohibited discrimination by any recipient of federal funds, or any federal agency, against "qualified" individuals with disabilities.67 This accidental addition to the Rehabilitation Act would prove momentous in shaping its progeny, the ADA. Crucial to rights advocates, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW, now called Health and Human Services) promulgated guidelines interpreting the Rehabilitation Act that defined the central (and vague) term "disability" under the Act. 68 The issuance of these HEW regulations, however, was greatly resisted by both the Ford and Carter administrations.
To precipitate their release, disability rights advocates engaged in a number of highly publicized protests. Especially visible were the April 1977 sit-ins at the ten regional HEW offices to protest then-Secretary Joseph Califano's recalcitrant refusal to authorize his own agency's regulations.69 The most significant demonstration occurred in San Francisco, where protestors remained in the HEW office building without food, attendant service, or medical care until Califano, who had authorized the siege-like conditions,70 yielded to public pressure and agreed to publish the HEW guidelines.7 1 Although Califano's capitulation was an important first step in the fight against disability-based discrimination,72 rights advocates were disappointed in the Rehabilitation Act's (non)effect upon disabled workers' employment. This ineffectiveness was due in large measure to the Supreme Court's narrow construction of the legislation, discussed below,73 that reified the epistemic rehabilitation community's ideas on normalizing the "whole" disabled man. 74
Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap in Programs and
Remonstrating against these detrimental judicial interpretations, activists lobbied to pass a new statute that would expand protections for workers with disabilities beyond the pale of the public sector, and be grounded in the type of rights framework that had been developed by the disability rights community.75 Under this "social model" of disability, disabled workers are no longer required to adapt perfectly to the job as a means of fitting in.76 Instead, the workplace environment and its seemingly "neutral" policies?? are obliged to accommodate workers with disabilities as a means of vitiating artificial exclusions that have prevailed due to pervasive social attitudes.78
Enacted by Congress in 1990, the ADA achieved the disability rights activists' stated goals. 79 Modeled after existing civil rights statutes, the statute was "heralded as the most significant law since the Civil Rights Act of 1964" [Vol. 55:607 (i.e., Title VI1).80 The ADA's employment provisions, contained in Title I, were drawn directly from the Rehabilitation Act in "an attempt to provide greater relief for people with disabilities" than existed at the time. 8! Moreover, the drafters anticipated that using the same language in the ADA would avoid definitional difficulties for courts that, presumably, were already familiar with their application through Rehabilitation Act claims.82 Accordingly, Title I defines a person with a disability as an individual who has either "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities,"83 has had a history of such an impairment, 84 or is currently regarded as having one. 85 Similarly tracking its predecessor, the ADA adopted as a condition precedent to statutory protection that a disabled worker be "qualified," meaning that she could perform the essential functions of a given job, either with or without provision of a required reasonable accommodation. 86 Despite the open-ended nature of these provisions and the optimism with which they were greeted, O'Brien avers that the ADA's impact on disabilityrelated employment has been "profoundly disappointing."87 At the heart of the ADA's inefficacy, she claims, is an interpretation by the federal trial courts of "disability" that places claimants in a Catch-22: "[E]ither they have such a severe disability that they are not qualified to work, or their disability is not serious enough to warrant statutory protection."88 This was an issue, according to O'Brien, that neither ADA activists nor the business community "could have anticipated" as federal courts "switched" their gate-keeping emphasis from qualification to coverage by substituting their own judgment for those of medical experts. 89 As a result, some eighty percent of Title I claims are "thrown out on summary judgment."90 Nonetheless, as egregious as is this treatment of disabled plaintiffs by the lower federal courts, "the Supreme Court went even further," according to O 
See infra

C. The Supreme Court and Disability Employment Policy
According to O'Brien, one consequence of the whole man schema of rehabilitation is the Supreme Court's resistance to recognizing and enforcing disability rights. This is particularly so with respect to the ADA's employment provisions.
As a preface to discussing the Court's ADA jurisprudence, O'Brien describes how the Justices "constrained" disability-related rights prior to the ADA's enactment. O emphasizing whether an individual is 'otherwise qualified' under the Rehabilitation Act, the Court "encouraged employers to either make light of employees' or applicants' disabilities or emphasize their incompetence."! 13 Worse still, "[t]he Supreme Court widely viewed people with disabilities as inferior to those without them, and expressed this view by having them shoulder the initial burden of proof in disability law" by requiring claimants to demonstrate that they belong to the protected class.ll4 This was especially apparent in the Court's first, and some would argue paradigmatic, liS attempt to grapple with the Rehabilitation Act's definition of disability in School Board v. Arline.116 Affirming a lower court's ruling that a school teacher with currently asymptomatic tuberculosis is a "handicapped individual," Justice Brennan wrote that although "[s]uch an impairment might not diminish a person's physical or mental capabilities," it could still limit substantially the teacher's working ability "as a result of the negative reactions of others to the impairment."ll7 O'Brien avers that, in so ruling, the Court bolstered society's resentment towards people with disabilities by both acknowledging and highlighting their differences from the able-bodied mainstream. liS
In discussing the Court's ADA jurisprudence, O'Brien focuses on the Justices' "constraining" interpretation of the definition of disability, one that has created "legal dams" against further Title I claims. In making these assertions, O'Brien analyzes four of the six ADA decisions handed down at the time of publication,119 and how each treats the definition of disability: would adopt when approaching the definition of disability in later cases. 125 The Court in Sutton decided that severely myopic twins who aspired to pilot airplanes were not disabled due to the corrective lenses they used to prevent substantial limitation of the major life activity of seeing.l26 The opinion "gave employers the right to discriminate" against those "with limiting impairments."127 Expanding the ruling in Sutton, the Murphy Court held that a driver with high blood pressure was not disabled since medication mitigated his impairment.128 Thus, Vaughan Murphy was placed in an untenable bind wherein he "functioned too well to be thought of as having a disability" while also being considered "too sick to perform the job."129 Also relying upon Sutton, Kirkingburg held that a truck driver with monocular vision was not per se disabled because of mitigating factors. 1 30 Consequently, the fact that Hallie Kirkingburg's body compensated for its own limitation stripped him of ADA protecti on.131
According to O'Brien, the rulings in each of these cases demonstrate the influence of the whole man schema of rehabilitation over the individual Justices. She therefore relates the Court's analytical approach to the principles underlying the vocational rehabilitation movement by drawing parallels between the perspectives of the judiciary and those of the epistemic rehabilitation community.132
Just as rehabilitation experts possessed a functionalist view of people with disabilities, "judges do not recognize that persons have a disability because they have a specific impairment, but [only] if this condition substantially interferes with [or limits] a significant aspect of their lives."133 In considering how people with disabilities mitigate their impairments, the Justices compared the disabled to able-bodied persons, thereby invoking the normalizing goal of the rehabilitation movement.134 Additionally, the Court afforded ADA protection only to those people with disabilities whose impairments substantially limited a major life activity.135 For O'Brien, the consequence of.this standard is that people with disabilities who have mitigated the impact of their impairments are considered "whole." ADA protection is therefore, in the Court's view, unnecessary as well as overcompensatory for those types of individuals. 140. These are discussed infra Part ll.A-C. I have not included Mark Kelman's work (which I very much admire, but with which I do not always agree) in the textual discussion for the reason that it focuses exclusively on Bragdon, at least so far as Supreme Court decisions are concerned. See community) upon the federal judiciary and, in particular, the Justices of the Supreme Court. In order to evaluate O'Brien's critique of modem disability jurisprudence, it is necessary to place her arguments in the context of other scholarly modes of assessment, each of which will now be examined.
A. The ADA as a Disharmonious Statute
In a jointly written article, Samuel Issacharoff and Justin Nelson attempt to reconcile the Court's jurisprudence with the ADA's statutory scheme.I45 They argue that the Court's decisions in Sutton, Murphy, and Kirkingburg reflect the Justices' inability to harmonize the ADA's antidiscrimination mandates with its redistributive effects.I46 First, this is because, unlike Title VII, the ADA is primarily redistributive rather than prohibitive of discrimination.147 Second, the ADA does not fund or create risk distribution among employers or taxpayers for its associated costs.l48
It can also be argued that Congress was negligent in drafting the ADA when it adopted wholesale (in part as the result of a political compromise among cross-disability rights groups and groups who represented people with specific disabilitiesl49) the definition of disability from the Rehabilitation Act. I 50 For although the definition itself was meant to be neutral, the sociolegal-cultural accretion of established welfarist classifications continued to influence post-ADA Supreme Court decisions. I 51 In other words, because the ADA followed so closely on the Rehabilitation Act, the Justices continued to assume that the targeted population should equally be characterized as incompetent. 
B. The Justices and the Disabled: Discomfort
A vi am Soifer has contributed two accounts of how the current Justices do not relate to the group of individuals with disabilities targeted by the ADA. First, he has argued that the Court's ADA interpretations reflect a lack of concern for the pet;sonal dignity of people with disabilities.154 As such, he criticizes the Justices for hypocritically proclaiming the need to make individualized assessments of those seeking ADA protection, while at the same time not considering as individual people the disabled plaintiffs themselves.155 Soifer also asserts that the Court's rulings reveal a "stealth strategy" in which only narrow, easily restricted instances of ADA coverage that grab public attention are upheld.156 Meantime, a majority of the Justices remain firmly unconvinced that the disabled require (or even deserve) legal protection. 157 An alternative but complementary explanation is that the Justices are generally unfamiliar with disabl~d Americans due, in part, to their unique civil rights chronology.158
Unlike other marginalized groups, people with disabilities were empowered by legislation before a general elevation of social consciousness about their circumstances and capabilities.159 Thus it is not entirely surprising that the Court's view of the disabled, much like the view of society at large, does not conform to the spirit of the statute's legislative findings or to the letter of assertions made by disability rights advocates.160
C. The Justices and the ADA: Underlying Principles
Samuel Bagenstos offers three distinct attempts at gleaning the principles that either underlie or ought to motivate the Court's ADA jurisprudence. First, he argues that the Court's definition of disability could be seen as by and large extending ADA protection only to those individuals subject to disability-related stigma that subjects them to systematic disadvantage.161 This "antisubordi- 160. Perhaps, then, the Title I win/loss statistics cited by O'Brien might be a partial answer to the rhetorical question posed almost a decade ago: "What happens when Congress grants a new group minority rights, but society has little understanding that those rights have been awarded or why they are needed?" SHAPIRO, supra note 10, at 323.
161. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and "Disability," 86 VA. L.
(Vol. 55:607 nationist" approach confonns to accepted constitutional theory, and is also coherent with other civil rights legislation.162 Alternatively, the Court's decisions can be viewed through the lens of risk regulation.163 When balancing the relative costs and benefits to the parties, the Justices defer to technocratic scientific risk regulation.164 Most recently, Bagenstos argues that the Court is more inclined to apply the ADA to those individuals with functional impainnents who are likely to become dependent on public assistance in the absence of protection.J65 Such an interpretation renders the Court's rulings consistent with the stated goals of the ADA when it was "sold" to Congress, and especially for the business interests represented therein.166
Ill. THE JUSTICES AND THE WHOLE MAN
Although valuable for raising a novel notion regarding the Supreme Court's treatment of people with disabilities, Crippled Justice suffers from three main flaws: The book neglects to properly develop the notions it presents; it tends towards carelessness in describing certain topics; and, most significantly, it is ultimately unconvincing.
O'Brien proffers very provocative and interesting theories, but then fails to discuss these premises or their implications adequately.167 Examples of this faulty methodology include her assertions that the Court refused to grant wider disability rights through the provision of reasonable accommodations because of their cost,168 that the ADA satisfactorily "pieced together an amalgam of phrases to denote the qualifications for a constitutionally suspect classification,"169 and that the lower federal courts have ignored the guidance of both administrative agencies and Congress when interpreting disabilityrelated rights statutes.170 Each of these arguments contains valid, interesting points. Support for these assertions might have included, respectively, a discussion of how the ADA compares with other civil rights statutes, REv. 397 (2000 particularly as accommodation costs are concemed;171 the effect on ADA litigation that a clearer congressional endorsement of heightened constitutional classification 172 would have had; 173 and what disability jurisprudence would look like if the Court deferred either to congressional findings174 and/or to administrative regulations, especially in relation to the EEOC's interpretive guidelines. 175 An attendant difficulty presented by the book is that O'Brien's arguments suffer from imprecision.176 For example, in discussing Cleburne, O'Brien mistakenly characterizes Justice White's majority opinion as holding that the Court did not provide rational basis scrutiny for the law in question.177 Later on she states that the "zoning law failed to meet what White described as the minimal requirement of rationality required of any law."178 Likewise, Justice Brennan's opinion in Arline is castigated on the ground that in applying the "regarded as" prong of the Rehabilitation Act, he · condoned social stereotypes,l79 while Justice O'Connor is taken to task for not applying the ADA's identical "regarded as" provision in Sutton, thereby giving employers 171. See Stein, supra note 64 (demonstrating the empirical inaccuracy of this postulate and the manner in which it has become received wisdom among many legal academics).
172. In a nutshell, Congress specifically mentioned in its ADA findings that people with disabilities were "a discrete and insular minority" facing the "serious and pervasive social problem" of discrimination. It also noted that people with disabilities often have "no legal recourse to redress such discrimination" and are "relegated to a position of powerlessness in our society." 42 U.S.C.A. § 12,10l(a) (West 2002 The central failing of Crippled Justice, however, is that O'Brien's thesis of the whole man schema is unconvincing. This is so for three main reasons. First, some of the cases cited are incongruent to her theory. Second, O'Brien's thesis is overly broad and therefore cannot be sustained. Third, the book does not specifically connect the normative whole man schema (as opposed to that of general bias) to the Court's actions.
To begin with, several of the cases she cites as illustrative of application of the schema in fact do not conform to her thesis. Adherents to the epistemic rehabilitation community's trope, for example, would likely favor plaintiffs with impairments who nonetheless managed to perform their jobs, especially when they did so without requesting special accommodation.
Hallie Kirkingburg, who drove a truck using monocular vision,187 and Vaughan Murphy, who conveyed parcels despite his high blood pressure, 1 88 are each primary examples of the type of disabled success stories that Rusk and Switzer advocated. Placed on a hypothetical Supreme Court bench, an epistemic rehabilitation community Justice would have ruled in each of these plaintiffs' favor. As it turns out, the Supreme Court went the other way. Thus, the whole man schema is not convincing as a determinate guide to resolving Supreme Court ADA decisions.
Additionally, the logical extension of O'Brien's whole man thesis, wherein the only acceptable disabled workers are those who perform their duties without altering the workplace, is that no accommodation will be palatable to the Court. Although some disability rights advocates might agree with this assertion,189 I do not. Barnett, 192 the Court held that a requested accommodation that conflicts with a seniority system is ordinarily unreasonable.193 Nevertheless, the Court ruled that an employee can show special circumstances where it is reasonable to make an exception to the seniority system, thus compelling the employer to grant an accommodation (here, reassignment).l94 In so doing, the Court rejected U.S. Airways' argument that any change to a "neutral" workplace rule is per se 187. See Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 557 (1999 Thus, contrary to the whole man schema, circumstances do exist in which the Court seems at least receptive to the possibility of accommodating a worker with a disability. 197 Most detrimental to O'Brien's thesis is that she fails adequately to demonstrate why the normative whole man schema influenced the Court's interpretation of disability-related employment issues. This is primarily due to the overly ambitious scope of her thesis. At times O'Brien infers that the epistemic rehabilitation community's vision of disability held a hegemonic precedence in Cold War-era American culture.198 Certainly, her assertion that this period was also the heyday of psychoanalysis in that society is well taken.199 However, to be persuasive O'Brien would need to show that the Justices who lived through that period were acculturated by the intellectual milieu of psychoanalytic thinking; further, that as a result of this indoctrination they in tum absorbed the epistemic rehabilitation community's vision of disability.
So global a view of the Justices' motivation is essential to O'Brien's thesis. It would not be sufficient, for example, to assert that the current Supreme Court's constricting view of disability-related rights is merely a corollary of their general aversion to expansive readings of civil rights laws. 200 For although a very strong case has been (convincingly) made that the current conservative majority is hostile to antidiscrimination provisions and is engaged m an agenda to roll back civil rights,201 such a straightforward, politically partisan claim does not explain why traditionally liberal Justices have frequently joined their counterparts.202 Consequently, to adequately prove the influence of the whole man schema of rehabilitation posited in her book, O'Brien needed to demonstrate the actual influence of this precept upon the Court's members. Had she done so, Crippled Justice would have presented a fascinating view of post-World War II American society, one seen through the lens of disability and employment.
To be fair, successful treatments of the effect of larger intellectual milieus upon specific judges acting in particular circumstances are Herculean tasks, and thus justifiably rare. 203 name just one, asserts that able-bodied society feels "existential anxiety" towards the disabled.208 The combination of repugnance to disabled bodily difference and fear of also attaining such variation in the future, according to Hahn, result in a sociological desire to segregate people with disabilities from the mainstream.209 It also results in the Supreme Court's aversion to upholding disability-related rights. 2IO In addition, a larger story can be told regarding the threat that disability accommodations pose to workplace hierarchies, and how they are viewed as a means of eroding employer control. This is a theme O'Brien hints at throughout the book, and even includes in her conclusion, but she does not examine it in any depth.211 It can be argued, for example, that current disability law resembles the abandoned, chauvinistic framework for determining sex equality. 212 Consequently judges presume, based on unfounded stereotypes, that people with disabilities have a diminished capability to perform social functions (such as work) without grounding those assumptions in fact. 213 Likewise, when confronted with disability discrimination claims, judges do not even perceive those assertions as having merit, much as they did not acknowledge parallel claims of sexual discrimination.214 Accordingly, the Justices will examine in depth the bases on which employers justify the exclusion of women from workplace opportunities (as they did in UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc.,215 discussed below), but routinely accede to employers' stipulations on occupational necessity for denying disabled workers' labor market participation.
Nor does the ruling in PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin,216 wherein the Court ruled that the fundamental nature of a professional golf tournament was not altered by allowing a disabled participant to use a golf cart, 217 detract from this argument. The Martin decision went to the issue of public accommodation under Title III of the ADA, rather than to an employer's duty under Title 1,218 and are to be pitied"); Anita Silvers, The Unprotected: Constructing Disability in the Context of Antidiscrimination Law, in AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES: EXPLORING IMPLICATIONS OF THE LAW FOR INDIVIDUALS AND INSTITUTIONS, supra note 19, at 133-34 (noting a history of bias against the disabled due to the "consequent burdens and dangers their presence in public posed both for them and for the common good").
More significantly, it highlights that the Court is very selective about which activities it is willing to investigate the fundamental natures of.219 In the context of investigating the fundamental nature of job requirements, there is a clear divergence between the methodology applied to investigating exclusions based on sex from that utilized for disability.220
The most recently decided Title I case, Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal,22i holding that employers may exclude not only workers who pose dangers to others but also those who endanger themselves, nicely illustrates this contrast between the Court's treatment of sex and disability.222 The Echazabal Court explicated the harms that the plaintiff might cause only in terms of the potential costs (such as tort liability) that would be borne by the employer, rather than as those which might harm his own health.223 In stark contrast, the Court in Johnson Controls went to great length to explain that an employer's potential liability was not a valid consideration for precluding workplace opportunity for women.224 That Court, moreover, explicitly required an employer to demonstrate that "sex or pregnancy actually interferes with the employee's ability to perform the job" in order to justify its exclusionary policy.225 By comparison, the Justices in Echazaballeft the standard of proof unstated.226 Finally, the Echazabal Court noted that excluding disabled workers who were willing to hazard their own health avoided unfounded stereotypical judgments based on broad categories of the type utilized by the defendant in Johnson Controls.227 Accordingly, while the Court was willing to parse out the underlying motivation and justification for excluding women in Johnson Controls, it left those considerations untouched in Echazabal. unconvincing. This is primarily due to her inability to demonstrate that the Justices who lived through the 1950s and 1960s were so indoctrinated by the intellectual milieu of psychoanalytic thinking that they continue to be influenced by that epistemic community's vision of disability. Nevertheless, the book provides a valuable service by raising a key question: Why is the Supreme Court (as well as the lower federal courts) averse to disability-related employment claims?
Many answers can, and hopefully will, be forthcoming. 
